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The Globalization of Liberalization: Policy Diffusion in the
International Political Economy
BETH A. SIMMONS Harvard University
ZACHARY ELKINS University of Illinois
O
ne of the most important developments over the past three decades has been the spread of liberal
economic ideas and policies throughout the world. These policies have affected the lives of mil-
lions of people, yet our most sophisticated political economy models do not adequately capture
inﬂuences on these policy choices. Evidence suggests that the adoption of liberal economic practices
is highly clustered both temporally and spatially. We hypothesize that this clustering might be due to
processes of policy diffusion. We think of diffusion as resulting from one of two broad sets of forces: one
in which mounting adoptions of a policy alter the beneﬁts of adopting for others and another in which
adoptions provide policy relevant information about the beneﬁts of adopting. We develop arguments
within these broad classes of mechanisms, construct appropriate measures of the relevant concepts, and
test their effects on liberalization and restriction of the current account, the capital account, and the
exchange rate regime. Our ﬁndings suggest that domestic models of foreign economic policy making
are insufﬁcient. The evidence shows that policy transitions are inﬂuenced by international economic
competition as well as the policies of a country’s sociocultural peers. We interpret the latter inﬂuence as a
form of channeled learning reﬂecting governments’ search for appropriate models for economic policy.
O
ne of the most important developments over
the past three decades has been the growing
willingness of governments to open up the na-
tional economy to global market forces. The wide-
spread rollback of policies that block the free move-
mentofgoodsandcapitalhasaffectedthequalityoflife
for millions of the world’s citizens. Economists reckon
the gains to developing countries from a liberalized
capital regime to be in the billions of dollars of added
GDP growth (Dobson and Hufbauer 2001; Soto 2000).
Some, however, acknowledge the instability and hu-
man insecurity left in liberalization’s wake (Kaplinsky
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2001; Prasad et al. 2003). These debates have not been
resolved. Nevertheless, few policy choices are as fun-
damental as those that determine how a national econ-
omy should engage—or resist—the forces of economic
globalization.
Despite its centrality to the economic history of the
last third of the twentieth century, we know little about
the conditions that underlie the ebb and ﬂow of liber-
alization worldwide. The political economy literature
has typically assumed that the most important politi-
cal processes to model are largely internal to each na-
tional polity. Scholars have built theory about the pref-
erences of domestic actors for liberalization (Frieden
1991;Rogowski1989),exploredthepartisansourcesof
economicandﬁnancialpolicy(EpsteinandSchor1992;
Simmons 1994), and linked the rent-seeking behav-
ior of governments to resistance to opening the econ-
omy (Alesina, Grilli, and Milesi-Ferretti 1994; Leblang
1997). These benchmark works tend to play down or
neglect altogether the role of international politics or
broader external social relations. The risk is high that
political economy models of economic liberalization
have been under- or even misspeciﬁed.
As we show, evidence indicates that transitions to
economic liberalization cluster in time and space. The
question is, What can account for these tides of foreign
economic policy liberalization and restriction? A cru-
cial explanation, we believe, lies in policy diffusion,1 in
which the decision to liberalize (or restrict) by some
1 There is a rich tradition of research on the geographic diffusion
of a whole host of political, social, and economic phenomena. In
political science, see the work of Walker (1969) and Gray (1973) on
the diffusion of policy among the states of the United States, Collier
andMessick(1975)onsocialsecurity,andTolbertandZucker(1983)
oncivilservicereform.OndemocraticdiffusionseeHuntington1991,
O’Laughlin et al. 1998, and Starr 1991. A parallel set of studies exists
in sociology with respect to institutional evolution (e.g., Meyer and
Rowan 1977, Powell and Dimaggio 1991, and Strang 1991).
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governments inﬂuences the choices made by others.2
Wetheorizetwobroadclassesofdiffusionmechanisms:
one in which foreign policy adoptions alter the bene-
ﬁts of adoption for others and another in which these
adoptions provide information about the costs or ben-
eﬁts of a particular policy innovation. In developing
these arguments, we explicitly acknowledge the alter-
natives. For example, liberalization patterns could be a
response to commonly experienced phenomena (cur-
rency crises, economic recession) rather than the result
of interdependent state behavior. Similarly, economic
liberalization may simply be the preference of liberal
democracies; such preferences alone may lead govern-
ments to respond similarly, but independently,t ot h e
conditionstheyface.Bothoftheseprocessescouldlead
to highly clustered policy making, but we would not
classify either of them as a diffusion process.3 For our
purposes,theyconstitutenullhypothesesagainstwhich
accountsofinterdependentdecisionmakingmustcom-
pete.
We focus on explaining changes within three foreign
economic policy areas, each of which is primarily mon-
etary or ﬁnancial in nature but has a profound impact
on the real economy. The ﬁrst is liberalization of the
current account, which includes foreign debt repay-
ment and payment for goods, services, and invisibles
(see Simmons 2000). The second is liberalization of
the capital account, or the removal of taxes, quotas,
or other rules that discourage the free movement of
investment funds into and out of a country (Quinn and
Inclan 1997). The third policy is the uniﬁcation of the
exchangerate,oreliminatingmultipleortieredsystems
thatcanbeusedtodiscriminateagainstparticularkinds
oftransactionsorparticulartradingpartners(Reinhart
and Rogoff 2002). Together, these three policy areas
constitute the principal aspects of international mon-
etary and ﬁnancial liberalization over the past three
decades. We argue that these choices are inﬂuenced by
the choices of other governments as much as they are
by exogenously given domestic institutions or prefer-
ences that can be traced back to domestic political or
economic structures. Our task is to demonstrate how
and why these policy choices diffuse internationally.
One can observe a strong trend, with ﬁts and starts,
toward liberalization in these three areas over the past
30years.In1967,25membersoftheInternationalMon-
etary Fund (IMF; 24% of its membership) had capital
accounts that were practically free of restrictions, 38
(37%) had fully liberalized current accounts, and 75
(73%) had uniﬁed exchange rate systems. By 1996, 54
members (30%) had removed virtually all restrictions
2 We use the term diffusion to refer to all processes in which “prior
adoption of a trait or practice in a population alters the probability
of adoption for remaining non-adopters” (Strang 1991). A host of
relatedphenomenaissubsumedunderthisdeﬁnition(e.g.,imitation,
demonstration effects, mimicry, emulation, isomorphism, contagion,
dissemination,transfer),whichwewillassumetobepartofthemore
general phenomenon with which we are concerned.
3 Wedistinguishdiffusionprocessesfromdiffusionoutcomes,orsim-
ple clustering in time and space. Processes of policy diffusion are one
class of explanation for such clustering, but there are a number of
alternative explanations, which we discuss below.
on the capital account, while 79 (45%) had liberalized
the current account and 158 (or 88% of the member-
ship) had uniﬁed their exchange rate systems.4 But
more than this trend, what concerns us is that tran-
sitions to and from these policies tend to be highly
concentrated in certain years and particular regions.
For example, the bulk of the transitions to uniﬁed ex-
changeratesoccurredinthemid-1970sandagaininthe
mid-1990s.Similarly,thelate1960sandmid-1990swere
times of high activity in current and capital account
liberalization. Policy clusters can be conﬁrmed statisti-
cally:Thedistributionoftransitioncounts(bothliberal
and restrictive transitions) ﬁts a negative binomial dis-
tribution (which assumes clustered data) better than
it does the distribution from a random, nonclustered
process such as the Poisson.5
Foreign economic policy transitions tend to cluster
spatially as well. As the 1995 maps in Figure 1 demon-
strate, the three economic policies have a distinctly
regional cast. But why, exactly, should near neighbors
choose similar policies? We suspect that geographical
clustering is largely spurious and can be explained by
a more precise set of relationships. We suggest two
broad diffusion mechanisms for clustered policies: (1)
foreigneconomicpolicychoiceselsewherecanalterthe
payoffs associated with choosing or maintaining a par-
ticular policy, and (2) foreign economic policy choice
elsewherecanchangetheinformationsetonwhichgov-
ernments base their own policy decisions.6
EXPLAINING CLUSTERED TRANSITIONS IN
FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY MAKING
Altered Payoffs
In this class of mechanisms, the policy decisions of one
governmentalterthecostsandbeneﬁtsofthepolicyfor
others. One can think of these decisions as producing
externalities that subsequent adopters must factor into
theirdecisioncalculus.Onetypeofexternalityishighly
material and works through direct economic competi-
tion.Anotherismoreideationalandworksthroughthe
more subjective pressures of prevailing global norms.
4 IMF: Annual Exchange Arrangements and Restrictions, analytical
appendix, various issues. Similar trends can be observed with data
presented by Prasad et al. (2003).
5 ThePoissonisarareeventsdistributionthatassumestheabsenceof
preciselythetwosourcesofconvergencethatwepurporttodisentan-
gle in this article. Speciﬁcally, the distribution assumes that the mean
equals the variance, which, in an event count, implies that events
occur independently and that the susceptibility of a particular event
is homogeneous across units, which in this case is years (King 1989).
If there is overdispersion (variance greater than the mean)—an ef-
fect of highly clumped data—then the Poisson will not ﬁt the data
well. The negative binomial, on the other hand, is less restrictive and
treats the variance as a parameter to be estimated. For each set of
policy reversions, we performed a chi-square test of the equivalence
of distributions. In each case, a likelihood-ratio test reveals that the
dataonpolicychoiceﬁtanegativebinomialdistributionsigniﬁcantly
better than they do a Poisson.
6 Policy innovation elsewhere may affect both payoffs and informa-
tion, but we view these mechanisms as analytically, if not always
empirically, distinct.
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FIGURE 1. Geographic Dispersion of Three
Economic Policies (1995)
Altered Material Payoffs. One of the important in-
sights of economists who pioneered the early in-
terdependence literature was that economic policies
adoptedinonecountrycanhaveeconomiceffectselse-
where, with profound consequences for policy making
(Cooper 1968). These insights informed a generation
of political economy work concentrated on issues of
macroeconomic policy coordination among the major
economies (Hamada 1985; Iida 1999).
International markets for goods and especially for
capital are the conduit for policy interdependence in
these models. Here we focus on competition among
policy makers to attract capital and international busi-
ness generally as a means to enhance aggregate eco-
nomic growth (Stockman and Hernandez 1988). Policy
liberalization in country A may make it a relatively
more attractive venue for investment or conducting
commercialrelations.Indeed,economistshavestressed
that capital and trade respond positively to the signal
that policy liberalization sends (Bartolini and Drazen
1997).Whenacountry’sforeigncompetitorsliberalize,
tradersandinvestorsaredrawntolocationswherethey
can do business more freely and securely. Anticipating
thisoutcome,countryBmayfeelcompetitivepressures
tomatchitsrival’sliberalpolicy.Thisphenomenonsets
up the possibility of competition among jurisdictions,
at least on the margins, for international economic ac-
tivity.
In this model, governments act strategically in order
to attract economic activity to their jurisdiction with
theultimateaimofboostingaggregategrowth.Pluralist
renditionsemphasizethepreferencesofelectorallysig-
niﬁcantﬁrmsorgroupsinclarifyingtoleaderstheinter-
eststheyhaveinsuchpolicies(EncarnationandMason
1990; Goodman and Pauly 1993). In more statist ver-
sions, decision makers take such actions regardless of
theimmediatepreferencesofdomesticpoliticalgroups
(Krasner 1985); in the medium run, they are gambling
on an aggregate growth payoff for which, presumably,
they will be rewarded by continued political support.
In each case, the government faces incentives to an-
ticipate and match decisions made outside its jurisdic-
tion, rather than waiting passively for these decisions
to work their way through the international economy,
the domestic economy, and the domestic electoral sys-
tem.Inaninternationalenvironmentthatisassumedto
be institutionally thin and nonhierarchical, the result is
competitive pressure to implement capital- and trade-
friendlypolicieswhenmajorcompetitorshavedoneso.
Note that this model does not predict universal con-
vergence on liberalization. It predicts convergence to-
ward either restrictive or liberal policies among com-
petitors. We assume that a decision maker has good
informationabouttheidentityofcompetitors,theirpol-
icychoices,andthematerialconsequencesofmatching
or failing to match their policies. The model leads to
the following prediction:
Governments’liberalizationpolicieswillbein-
ﬂuencedbythepoliciesoftheirmostimportant
foreign economic competitors.
Altered Reputational Payoffs. Changesinprevailing
global ideas and the practices they entail create exter-
nalities for governments as well. One of the hallmarks
of the current trend toward globalization is the ascen-
dancy of theories that emphasize market mechanisms
asenginesofeconomicgrowth(Gore2000;McNamara
1998; Williamson 1993). The spread of liberalization
both reﬂects and buttresses the power of a neoliberal
ideational consensus.
Ideational consensus is a potential externality be-
cause it alters the reputational payoffs associated with
policy choice. As growing numbers of important actors
articulate theories and implement practices that reﬂect
a normative consensus, the legitimacy of these ideas
gathers steam. In the absence of ideational consensus,
heterodox policies are difﬁcult to distinguish and are
readily tolerated. But theoretical consensus on an ap-
propriate economic model raises the intangible costs
of nonconformity. Perceived policy failures associated
with “heterodoxy” will suffer greater public condem-
nation than similar failures of conforming policy. Gov-
ernmentsthatresistideationaltrendsfacereputational
consequences that cast doubt on their approach to the
economy and potentially the legitimacy of their gover-
nance.
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FIGURE 2. Threshold Model of Policy Adoption
The logic that links normative consensus to le-
gitimacy externalities may be reﬂected in the “tip-
ping,” or “threshold,” models that Schelling (1978) and
Granovetter(1978)havedescribed.Thebasicintuition
in these models is that most governments are highly
sensitive to the number, or proportion, of other coun-
tries that have adopted a particular policy stance. The
ideaof“thresholds”or“criticalmasspoints”isauseful
(although not necessary) device for understanding the
process.
Figure 2 illustrates the classic effect of Schelling’s
conceptionofthresholdsontheprobabilityofadopting
a particular policy. Imagine a group of actors, each of
whom will adopt a given practice only if a critical mass
of others adopt. Assuming that the distribution of the
various critical mass points is normal, we can add them
and produce the s-curve in Figure 2 (which depicts the
mean critical mass point around 50%). Points on the
curve represent the proportion of actors who would
adopt a policy given the proportion of the population
that is expected to adopt. In this stylized scenario, one
can see that a small set of actors (about 5%) would
adoptthepolicyevenifnooneelseisexpectedtodoso.
Similarly, a small percentage of actors (about 15%) at
thetopofthecurvewillnotadopteveniftheyexpectev-
eryone else to adopt. The y=x line helps demonstrate
the equilibria that result from this dynamic. Points on
the curve under the identity line will resolve to the bot-
tom of the curve (at its intersection with the identity
line),becausethecriticalproportionthatactorsrequire
fortheiradoptionisalwayshigherthanthenumberwho
would adopt at that level. One can see the opposite
dynamic for points above the identity line, where the x
and yvariablesalsoreinforceoneanother,butthistime
produce an equilibrium point at the upper intersection
of the curve and the identity line.
Tipping models capture the dynamics of global
normsfairlywell.Forreputationalreasons,thepropor-
tion of others adopting may matter a great deal. Such
reasoning implies a clear empirical expectation:
The proportion of liberalizations in the sam-
ple at large should inﬂuence a government’s
decision to liberalize.
New Information
A conceptually distinct motor for policy diffusion is
informational. In contrast to the discussion of payoffs
above, this approach assumes that governments often
lack the crucial information they need to understand
the consequences of economic policy innovation.7 In-
novations elsewhere provide information on policy
consequences that may be more or less relevant in a
particular case. Governments are assumed here to use
availableinformationinarationalfashiontomaximize
thechancesoftheirownpolicysuccess.Sometimessuch
policy learning involves deliberate attention to foreign
models and their outcomes (see, e.g., Westney’s [1987]
description of Japanese statecraft in the 1800s). For-
eign models can encourage or expedite adoption by
inserting a policy innovation on a legislature’s agenda.
A foreign model may also offer a ready-made answer
to ill-deﬁned domestic pressure for “change” and “in-
novation.” Or it may legitimate conclusions or pre-
dispositions already held or add a decisive data point
in the evaluation of alternatives (Bennett 1991). But
what “lessons” do governments actually learn in the
economic policy realm? We hypothesize that they may
learnfrom“success,”viacommunicationnetworks,and
from cultural reference groups.
7 Aconsistentthemeinrecentresearchhasbeentheuncertaintysur-
roundingtheliberalizationprocess.ArecentstudybystaffoftheIMF
concludesthatbasicquestionsabouttheoptimalpaceandsequencing
of ﬁnancial integration are unresolved (Prasad et al. 2003, 5).
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Learning from Success. The most obvious sources of
lessonsforeconomicpolicymakingarethosethatseem
to “work.” By mechanisms consistent with theories of
Bayesian updating, governments are likely to follow
the lead of those countries whose economic conse-
quences appear to have been notably favorable. Thus
the Japanese “miracle” provided an economic model
for much of Asia and beyond in the 1970s and 1980s,
though it has been a far less attractive model during
the doldrums of the 1990s. Chile, too, is often cited as
a relevant “success story” for liberalization of emerg-
ing market economies, from Latin America to Asia to
Eastern Europe (Edwards and Edwards 1992).
Learningfromsuccessneednotdependontheability
of the government to reason in a sophisticated manner
about the links between a policy and its apparent out-
come. Indeed, “learning” can be quite superﬁcial, and
itofteninvolveslinkingahighlysalientoutcomewitha
policy innovation without complete information about
the causal connections. The apparent success of others
may in fact be a cognitive short-cut to assessing policy
consequences; the relevant question in this process is,
What policies are the high achievers pursuing? If this
form of learning is important, we should expect govern-
ments to be inﬂuenced by the policy innovations of the
best-performing economies.
Learning through Communication. Above we as-
sumed that learning was channeled by salient facts.
Another possibility is that it is primarily conditioned
by informational networks themselves. The exchange
ofinformationamongconnectedactorsisthepresumed
motor behind diffusion in most sociological studies
(Rogers 1995; see also Axelrod 1997). In these models,
information is largely channeled along speciﬁc actor
networks. The cognitive process is dominated by an
availability heuristic, in which actors unable to retrieve
afullsampleofinformationbasetheirdecisionsononly
those instances that are available to them (Kahneman,
Slovic, and Tversky 1982). The result is that the choice
set of policy makers will be limited to policies of states
that are immediately accessible to them.
One can readily identify the kinds of network and
communicative links that could contribute to learning
with respect to monetary and ﬁnancial liberalization.
Direct contacts at the intergovernmental level may re-
ﬂect well-established channels of communication: Fre-
quent intergovernmental meetings at multiple ofﬁcial
levels can transmit information to policy makers about
“what works” in other settings. It is well documented
that the process of negotiating and maintaining insti-
tutional afﬁliations may create opportunities to learn
and persuade (Haas 1959). Conversely, where ofﬁcial
contacts are infrequent, information is less likely to be
transmittedandlesslikelytobecomesalienttodecision
makers.
Policydiffusionmayfollowcommunicationchannels
mediatedbyprivateactorsaswell.Businesspeoplemay
transmit ideas about appropriate economic policy by
looking to the experiences of the countries with which
they have especially intense trading contacts. Lessons
drawnfromthesecontactsmayinformtheshapeofthe
demands they make on their own governments, thus
feeding into the demand side of the policy equation.
This argument suggests that policy diffusion should be
strongest among governments that are in especially
close communication. We should expect a positive re-
lationship between policies of governments with exten-
sive opportunities to share information about the conse-
quences of economic policy innovation.
Learning from Cultural Reference Groups. Actors
in uncertain and information poor environments ra-
tionally seek information relevant to their own policy
context. Learning takes place at least partially through
analogy,andlessonsareviewedasmorerelevanttheex-
tenttowhichaforeigncaseisviewedasanalogous.The
IPEliteraturereadilydistinguishesbetween“advanced
industrial,”“ emerging,” and “developing” countries
but completely overlooks a far more salient identity
marker that may shape the emulation process: cultural
similarity.
Culturalpropinquityisanonobviousyethighlyplau-
sible explanation for policy emulation, even in as
material an issue area as international ﬁnance. Cul-
turalfactorsunderlieeconomicandﬁnancialstructures
to a greater extent than is often realized. Granato,
Inglehart, and Leblang (1996) have shown that cul-
tural values are important to economic development.
Cargill and Parker (2001, 2) note, in their study of ﬁ-
nancial liberalization in China, that China adopted the
Japanese style of ﬁnance for “shared cultural and his-
toricalreasons.”TheexperienceofEgyptwithﬁnancial
liberalizationistypicallycitedastheappropriatesource
of lessons for “Arab banking systems” (Wahba and
Mohieldin 1998). Indeed, a new generation of research
explores the ways in which culture has reasserted itself
despite the globalization of markets (Beng-Huat 1999;
Chun 2000; Goff 2000).
Unlike organizational sociologists, who have con-
centrated on the apparently nonrational adoption of
policy models reﬂecting “world culture” (Meyer and
Rowan 1977; Powell and DiMaggio 1991; Scott and
Meyer 1994), we argue that cultural emulation reﬂects
reasonable efforts to learn from the most appropri-
ate available examples of policy innovation. We are
interested in testing a constructivist-inspired hypothe-
sis: Ideas about appropriate models are likely to reﬂect
deep identity concerns (Checkel 1993; Risse-Kappen
1994; Ruggie 1975). Sociologists have long assumed
thatsharedbeliefsandvaluesshapethechannelsalong
which ideas ﬂow (Rogers 1995, 274). In fact, the volu-
minous literature on diffusion and social inﬂuence has
found that entities that share similar cultural attributes
tendtoadoptthesamepractices.Thisistruenotonlyof
individual behavior like teen smoking (Coleman 1960)
and voting (Brady and Sniderman 1985; Lupia and
McCubbins 1998) but also of collective behavior with
respect to corporations (Davis and Greve 1997), non-
proﬁt organizations (Mizruchi 1989), states within fed-
erations (Walker 1969; Rose 1993), and indeed nation-
states (Deutsch 1953). The most plausible explanation
of this ﬁnding is that actors negotiating a complex set
of political choices regard the actions of actors with
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perceivedcommonvaluesasausefulguidetotheirown
behavior.
Butwhyshouldculturalgroupsberelevantreference
groups? For one thing, cultural markers are highly vis-
ible. If decision makers know one thing about another
country, it is usually the language its citizens speak or
thegeneraltenoroftheculturaltraditionstheypractice.
Moreover, common culture embodies subjective no-
tionsofidentitycontainedinassumptionsofcommonly
shared values and social purposes. The policies of cul-
turally similar countries are perceived to (and in fact
may) contain highly relevant information on the ap-
propriatenessofaparticularpolicyinaspeciﬁccontext
of shared values. This perceived similarity may provide
a cognitive short-cut for an individual or a focal point
to limit cycling over alternatives in a group decision-
making context. Furthermore, models used by favored
cultural groups may provide a persuasive rhetorical
spin in the debates that accompany policy evaluation
(on the importance of rhetoric and persuasion to the
policy evaluation process see Majone 1989). Following
the lead of cultural reference groups may even provide
awaytomitigatetheperceivedthreatstoculturaliden-
tityposedbyglobalization.8 Ineachcase,perceivedcul-
tural afﬁnity assists in selecting the relevant models, or
“reference groups,” that inform policy development.9
Admittedly, economic policy making—a practice with
very material ends and theoretical underpinnings that
make no explicit concessions to culture—may be im-
munetoculturallychanneledlearning.Butgivenahigh
degree of uncertainty about the consequences of a par-
ticular policy shift, governments may be inﬂuenced to
follow the lead of a culturally or socially similar group
of states.
Weexpectthatculturalsimilaritywillbeaposi-
tive predictor of policy diffusion among states.
DATA AND ANALYTICAL METHODS
The empirical problem now is (1) to identify meaning-
ful measures of the pressures from altered payoffs and
channeled forms of learning and (2) to estimate their
effects on the liberalization and restriction of foreign
monetary and ﬁnancial policy, while controlling for a
reasonable battery of nondiffusion effects.
Dependent Variables
Our dependent variables are transitions in each of
three policy areas—capital account openness, current
account openness, and exchange rate uniﬁcation. (See
Table 1 for descriptive statistics and sources.) Each of
the variables is a binary measure of whether the gov-
ernment has or has not imposed restrictions (or, in the
exchange rate case, a tiered or multiple system) in the
8 On the importance of perceived cultural threats in the Egyptian
case, see Amin 1981.
9 Rosenau(1990,213)termsthesereferencegroups“cathectic,”sug-
gesting that decision makers have a strong cultural sense of whom
their nation should look like.
givenyear(withpolicyliberalization=1).Thedataare
fromtheannualIMFvolumesonexchangerestrictions
and controls (Analytical Appendices; various issues).
These measures have been criticized on a number of
grounds, but for our purposes they are appropriate.
Oneconcernisthatthedichotomousmeasuremasks
the complexity and intensity of restrictions. For at least
one of the dependent variables (capital controls), data
withﬁnergradationsdoexist,thoughforasmallersam-
ple(Quinn1997).Allthingsbeingequal,wewouldpre-
fer to use a more ﬁnely grained measure. Nevertheless,
our purpose here is to model major policy shifts glob-
ally,andthecostinsensitivitywiththeIMF’sdataisbal-
ancedbytheircomprehensivecoverageacrosstimeand
space. It is less important, for our purposes, to capture
the nuance than it is to capture the foundational policy
demarches for a wide range of countries around the
world.Nonetheless,itiscrucialthatouruseofdichoto-
mous data does not misrepresent true trends. For this
reason, we compared the IMF capital control measure
with Dennis Quinn’s more nuanced measure for the
countries these two datasets have in common (namely,
27OECDcountriesbetween1967and1997).Theover-
all correlation between the dichotomous IMF data and
the polychotomous Quinn data is 0.65, suggesting that
the former do not suffer remarkably from unreliability.
TheQuinndataandthedichotomousIMFdatadiverge
mostinmorerecentyears.Theseareyearsforwhichthe
OECDcountrieshavealreadycrossedthethresholdto
liberalization by our cruder measure. Quinn’s measure
continuestopickupnuancesindegreesofliberalization
beyond this threshold, causing the correlation in later
years to come somewhat unhinged.
The existence of a superior but more limited dataset
provides an opportunity to check the validity of the
globallyavailabledichotomousmeasure.Theconstruct
validity of a measure of capital controls may be judged
by the comparative accuracy of its prediction of the
volume of capital ﬂows (see Collier and Adcock 2002
for a useful clariﬁcation of validity issues). When we
regress gross private capital ﬂows as a percentage of
GDP on the dichotomous measure and on Quinn’s
polychotomous measure (for the 27-country overlap-
ping sample), both measures appear highly statistically
andsubstantivelysigniﬁcant,afteraccountingforserial
autocorrelation in the time series with a ﬁxed effects
model. The R2 statistics for similar models employing
the measures successively are slightly higher for the
IMF measure than for the Quinn data for the same
country sample (0.57 compared to 0.53), and the stan-
dard error of the model (perhaps a better measure
than R2 because of the difference in scale of the two
measures) is lower for the IMF measure. And if we
focus just on the 1990s—the period for which these
measures diverge—the dichotomous measure predicts
even more of the variance with respect to capital ﬂows
than does the more nuanced Quinn measure (R2 of
0.64 compared to 0.57 and standard error of roughly 68
compared to 127). These tests suggest that the IMF’s
dichotomousmeasures,althoughcrude,arequitelikely
to be valid constructs for the phenomenon we have in
mind. Finally, as we need global data to test arguments
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TABLE 1. Summary Statistics and Sources for Variables Included in the Analysis
Mechanism or Data
Concept Explanatory Variable Mean SD Minimum Maximum Source(s)
Dependent variables Capital account policy 0.22 0.42 0 1.0 (1)
Exchange rate policy 0.73 0.44 0 1.0 (1)
Current account policy 0.46 0.50 0 1.0 (1)
Altered payoffs
Material
Competition Policies of capital 2.25 1.3 0 10 (1, 3)
competitors
Policies of trade 1.93 1.40 0 6.36 (1, 2)
competitors
Reputational
Global norms Mean global policy 2.26 0.31 1.80 3.4 (1)
New information
Learning from success Policies of high-growth 2.8 0.68 1.50 3.9 (1, 10)
countries
Communication networks Policies of trade partners 5.08 2.43 0 10 (1, 2)
Policies of BIT partners 5.60 3.69 0 10 (1, 5)
Policies of PTA partners 2.28 2.07 0 10 (1, 4)
Cultural similarity Policies of religion partners 2.22 1.14 0 8.6 (7–9)
Policies of colonial partners 1.69 1.68 0 10 (6)
Policies of language 3.11 2.18 0 10 (6)
partners
Control mechanisms
Economic conditions Current account/GDP (t − 2) −3.83 10.99 −240.52 70.21 (11)
GDP growth 4.08 14.27 −76.82 699.90 (11)
GDP per capita 3.31 5.62 0.03 37.42 (10)
(in thousands)
Interest rates 6.60 2.45 3.02 14.08 (12)
Currency crisis (t − 1) 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00 (20)
External political pressures Use of IMF credits 0.76 0.42 0 1 (17)
Foreign aid (per capita) 55.88 157.28 −75.31 2,337.98 (17)
Domestic political conditions Degree of openness 66.78 44.12 4.99 423.41 (10, 11)
Democracy 3.78 4.34 0.00 10.00 (13)
Nationalist executive 1.45 3.52 0.00 10.00 (14)
Central bank independence 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00 (18)
Common law legal tradition 0.34 0.47 0.00 1.00 (19)
Geography Policies of border countries 2.38 3.51 0 10 (15, 16)
Policies of neighbors 2.40 0.92 0 7.89 (15, 16)
Note: Summary statistics for the relational variables are calculated for the capital account: relational variables have been
multiplied by ten to improve presentation of the regression coefﬁcients. Data sources: (1) International Monetary Fund, Annual
Exchange Arrangements and Restrictions, analytical appendix, various issues; (2) International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade
Statistics; (3) Standard and Poors, Historical Sovereign Bond Ratings; (4) World Trade Organization, http://www.wto.org/english/
tratop e/region e/region e.htm; (5) World Bank, http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/treaties/i-1.htm; (6) Alvarez, Cheibub, Limongi,
and Przeworski 1996, Political and Economic Database Codebook, http://www.ssc.upenn.edu/∼cheibub/data/ACLP Codebook.
PDF; various country Web sites; (7) Countries of the World and Their Leaders Yearbook 2000; (8) Europa 1999; (9) Central Intelligence
Agency 1999; (10) Penn World Tables, http://www.bized.ac.uk/dataserv/penndata/pennhome.htm; (11) World Bank, STARs Database;
(12) International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics; (13) Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr, Polity IV; (14) Thorsten Beck,
George Clarke, Alberto Groff, Philip Keefer, and Patrick Walsh, 2001, “New Tools in Comparative Political Economy: The Database
of Political Institutions,” World Bank Economic Review. 15 (1): 165–76; (15) W. E. B. Hengeveld, World Distance Tables, 1948–74;
(16) ESRI, Arc-View World Dataset; (17) World Bank, World Development Indicators, http://devdata.worldbank.org/dataonline/;
(18) Cukierman 1992; McNamara and Castro 2003; (19) Global Development Network Growth Database, William Easterly and Hairong
Yu, World Bank; (20) Leblang 2003.
about global diffusion processes, and as we employ
event history methods (discussed below), the dichoto-
mous measure is most appropriate.
Another concern is that the IMF measures do a bet-
ter job of measuring “announced” policy than they
do “actual” policy. The validity analysis of the IMF
capital control measure above suggests that this dif-
ference is negligible. Nevertheless, with respect to the
exchange rate data, some authors have questioned
the correspondence between these reports and ac-
tual currency behavior. Reinhart and Rogoff (2002)
have developed a measure of exchange rate uniﬁca-
tion based on actual rates rather than reported gov-
ernment policies. Because their data are thought to
be the state of the art among economists, we coded
the descriptions from their qualitative appendix to see
to what extent they accord with the extant IMF data.
Our dichotomous coding of the Reinhart/Rogoff data
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with respect to exchange rate uniﬁcation correlated
quite highly with the IMF data (the datasets agree in
82% of the 3449 country-years they had in common
between 1967 and 1997). Disagreement between the
Reinhart/Rogoff data and the IMF’s was strongest in
theearly1970s,theperiodofbreakdownintheBretton
Woods system of ﬁxed rates.
Wecheckedtoseewhethertheroughly20%ofcases
of disagreement involved a systematic bias by the IMF
but found that the “off-diagonals” in a cross tabulation
were roughly equally distributed. There was a slight
tendencyforcountriestoreportauniﬁedexchangerate
when the behavioral measure indicated otherwise, but
these cases account for at most about 4% of the total
number of cases. As above, we also tried to conﬁrm the
validityoftheIMFdata.Becausemultipleratesystems
are sometimes used to discriminate against classes of
imports or importers, we compared regressions of im-
ports as a proportion of GDP on the two measures,
taken individually and then together. In this case, the
Reinhart/Rogoffmeasuredidslightlybetteratpredict-
ing imports in a ﬁxed effects model than did the IMF
measure. For this reason, we have replicated all ex-
change rate models with the Reinhart/Rogoff data.10
All of the main ﬁndings are robust to the use of either
dataset (see subsequent footnotes for details).
Diffusion Variables
In order to assess the source and strength of policy dif-
fusionpaths,wemustconstructvariablesthatplausibly
indicatechangingpayoffstructures(materialorreputa-
tional) and new sources of salient policy information.
Under these two broad rubrics, we seek to identify a
country’s various competitive, normative, communica-
tive, and cultural inﬂuences and combine this informa-
tion with the policy “cue” transmitted along that net-
work. The growing ﬁeld of spatial econometrics offers
a useful set of methods to incorporate these kinds of
variables (Anselin 1988).11 Spatial regression models
handlespatialdependenceinoneoftwoways.Oneisto
specifythespatialdependenceintheerrorterm(spatial
error models). This method is appropriate when spatial
dependenceisnothingmorethananuisancethatbiases
the interpretation of the parameters of interest. When,
as in our case, spatial dependence is itself the focus,
researchers include spatial terms as regressors in the
model (spatial lag models).
Spatial lag models treat spatial dependence in the
same way that time-series models treat serial corre-
lation. Instead of lagging the value of the dependent
variable one unit in time, one “lags” it one unit in
space. The spatial lag is the weighted average of the
dependentvariableintheactor’s“neighborhood.”The
neighborhood is mapped by an N × N spatial weights
matrix conventionally labeled W. Thus the spatial lag
10 Full results using the Reinhart/Rogoff exchange rate data are
available from the authors on request.
11 A parallel set of methods has developed within network analysis.
See, for example, Marsden and Friedkin 1993.
for country i can be written
Wyi =
 
j=1,...,N
Wij · yj,
where W is the spatial weights matrix and yj is the
dependent variable for country j. In matrix form we
write the relationship Wy, where y is an N × 1 vector
of observations on the dependent variable. These mea-
sures vary by year as well.12
As with time-series models, the spatial dependence
can be modeled as an autoregressive or as a moving
averagefunction,dependingonourassumptionsabout
the effect’s rate of decay. Because we expect spatial
effects to reverberate throughout the network and not
just from the closest actor, we adopt an autoregressive
function. We can express such a model as
Y = ρWy+ Xβ + ε,
where ρ is a spatial autoregressive coefﬁcient, W is the
n × n spatial weights matrix, Xis a vector of nondiffu-
sion regressors with coefﬁcients β, and ε is a vector of
error terms.13
In geographic models, the spatial weights matrix, W,
isoftenamatrixofgeographicdistancesamongunits.In
ourcase,weareinterestedinmeasuringinﬂuencealong
otherchannelscontrollingforgeography:throughcom-
petitors whose policies alter material payoffs, through
normsthatgainglobaladherentsandthusalterreputa-
tionalpayoffs,andthroughlinkagesthataltertheinfor-
mation set that informs policy decisions. The elements
of W differ according to the nature of the measure
of “distance” between units. These measures come in
two principal forms: (1) direct bilateral data that record
a level of interaction between states (e.g., amount of
trade,numberoftelephonecalls)and(2)afﬁliationdata
thatidentifysharedmembershipinvariousgroups(e.g.,
regional trade groups and language communities).
Indicators of Altered Payoffs. We have theorized
that altered payoffs spur policy liberalizations and that
these payoffs may be material or reputational. Com-
petitive economic pressures are a clear example of the
former. In order to measure the effect of competitive
mechanisms, we developed indicators of “competitive
distance” for two arenas of competition: the export
market for goods and services and the capital market.
For the export market we have created two measures.
The ﬁrst registers the degree to which nations compete
in the same foreign markets.14 Because an importing
country may ﬁnd ways to reciprocate or reward policy
liberalization in country A, country B has an incentive
toliberalizetotheextentthatAandBcompeteformar-
ket share within that third market. Using the bilateral
12 W, then, is an N × N × T matrix and y is an N×T matrix.
13 Inthemodelsreportedbelow,wemeasurethepoliciesofthetenth
of the sample closest to each country, by each measure. We also
tested models that allowed for a more gradual rate of decay in the
lag by weighting the dependent variable by the distance to all other
countries in the sample. The results were, on the whole, fairly similar
for these different lag structures.
14 For a similar approach see Finger and Kreinen 1979 and
Wasserman and Faust 1994.
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direction of trade data available from the IMF, we pro-
duceann×n×t matrixofcorrelations(betweencoun-
tries) across each country’s total exports to each of the
182 partner countries. The result is a matrix of yearly,
dyadicmeasuresofthedegreetowhichnationspossess
the same trade relationships. We use these “distances”
to identify the tenth of the sample most competitive
witheachcountryineachyear.Themeanofthedepen-
dent variable for this group is the spatial lag. Another
way to measure export competition is to observe the
similarity between countries according to their propor-
tionofexportsinvarioussectors.Thismeasurewascon-
structed by calculating the correlations between coun-
tries, by year, across a set of nine variables that scored
the countries on the percentage of their exports in nine
different sectors. We use these correlations, together
with the dependent variables of other countries, to cal-
culate the spatial lag in the way described above. We
expectapositiveassociationbetweenbothmeasuresof
policies of close trade competitors and the dependent
variable.
Competitors for investment capital are also likely to
be salient models for policy makers. Because investors
wantthefreedomtorepatriatetheirassets,amongoth-
erwise similar investment venues they will favor coun-
tries that allow for the liberal movement of capital and
currency at nondiscriminatory exchange rates. Ideally,
we seek an indicator that allows us to predict which
countries will compete for the same pool of interna-
tional capital. We begin by assuming that international
investors’ decisions depend on their varying tastes for
risk.Portfoliotheorysuggeststhatinvestorswillwantto
createaportfoliowithashareoflow-risk,medium-risk,
and high-risk investments (according to their tastes).
Investors may decide, for example, that 10% of their
portfoliowillbereservedforhigh-risk,potentiallyhigh-
return investments. Given this assumption, it is rea-
sonable to posit that countries that pose similar risks
are close substitutes from an investor’s point of view.
(TheUnitedStates,weassume,doesnotprimarilycom-
pete with Argentina for foreign capital, whereas Brazil
might.) Our measure groups countries by their yearly
Standard and Poor’s sovereign bond rating and calcu-
lates the mean policy score (for each policy area) for a
country’sratingcategoryforeachyear.15Ifcompetition
over the same “slice” of international capital provides
incentives to liberalize, then we expect a positive coef-
ﬁcient.
Using bond ratings in this way is unprecedented and
deserves some exposition. In a model predicting eco-
nomic policy, one may be concerned with the potential
endogeneity of bond ratings. It is reasonable to think
that analysts at Standard and Poor’s are accounting for
a country’s economic policy in their assessment of the
risk of default of the country’s bonds. But policies—
muchlessthespeciﬁcpoliciesweanalyzehere—appear
to play a minor role in the rating system. As Stan-
15 Because it is possible that the policies themselves help determine
the bond ratings, we experiment with models that lag the ratings by
two and three years. We ﬁnd that the results do not change signiﬁ-
cantly with this modiﬁcation.
dard and Poor’s describes their methodology, ratings
areconstructedbyaninformal(andsubjective)combi-
nation of one to ﬁve scores in eight areas, one of which
theoretically could include an assessment of ﬁscal pol-
icy. Empirical analyses suggest that the ratings depend
overwhelmingly on macroeconomic indicators of pub-
lic debt and inﬂation (Cantor and Packer 1996; Haque,
Mathieson, and Nelson 1997), and not the speciﬁc poli-
cies of interest here.
Nevertheless, we are sensitive to the possibility of
suchendogeneityand,accordingly,havedevelopedan-
other measure to identify capital competitors in order
tocorroborateourresults.Assumingthatpotentialfor-
eign direct investors are concerned with a country’s
human assets as well as its technological and com-
munications infrastructure, we reason that countries
withsimilareducationalandinfrastructuralproﬁleswill
compete for the same pool of capital. We compare
such investment proﬁles by calculating correlations, by
year, between countries across roughly 15 educational
and infrastructural variables selected from the World
Bank World Development Indicators. As we do for the
export competition measure, we use these distances
between countries to identify the tenth of the sample
“most similar” to each country in investment proﬁle.
The spatial lag is the mean of the dependent variable
for this group of countries.
We have also argued that changes in less tangible
payoffs such as legitimacy and prestige might be inﬂu-
enced by the prevalence of increasingly global norms,
theories, or beliefs embraced by governments else-
where. Heterodox policy failures are likely to earn a
government more criticism than would policy failures
that are consistent with a global consensus about what
constitutes wise, sustainable economic policy. We mea-
sure global norms with the yearly mean of the depen-
dent variable across all countries in the sample. One
maythinkofthisindicatorasameasureofunchanneled
diffusion pressure, something diffusion scholars some-
times call homogeneous, as opposed to heterogeneous,
mixing (Strang 1991).
Indicators of Informational Inﬂuences. Our second
cluster of arguments concerns changes in the informa-
tion set governments face. Our ﬁrst set of information
indicatorstapslearningfromapparentsuccess(rational
Bayesian updating). Many complex measures of suc-
cesscouldbedevised,butweoptforahighlyvisibleand
well-publicizedbottomline:growthrates.Ourmeasure
is the proportion of liberal (or restrictive) policies of
the top growth decile. The higher this proportion, the
clearer the message that liberalization “works.”
Our next set of indicators concerns communication
networks. At the ofﬁcial level, information about eco-
nomic policy options can be transmitted through ne-
gotiations and discussions among the members of eco-
nomicagreementsandgroupings,suchastheEuropean
Union or NAFTA.16 Another plausible channel for
16 Common membership in a PTA is likely to be endogenous (ex-
plained, for example, by shared attitudes toward policy liberaliza-
tion), but our formulation of the dependent variable (actual policies
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communicating expectations and information about
capitalaccountopennessisbilateralinvestmenttreaties
(BITs). Again, for each country-year, we calculate av-
erage policy scores weighted by PTA and by BIT part-
nerships. These common memberships should predict
channeled policy diffusion, based on the diffusion of
policy-relevant information.
Information can also ﬂow between decision makers
via private channels. Private actors who are exposed
to liberal foreign regimes for the movement of goods
and services may become convinced of the virtues of
thesearrangementsandattempttopersuadetheirgov-
ernments to liberalize. Learning may even take place
(though less plausibly) at the mass level: Extensive pri-
vate communications may persuade a relatively broad-
based segment of the populace in the home country
that liberalization is an appropriate policy. To allow for
these possibilities, we have gathered data on business
contacts (proxied here as direct bilateral trade links)
and estimates of telephone trafﬁc across pairs of coun-
tries. Once again, we weight the policy in the foreign
country by the intensity of these communication chan-
nels.
We have also argued that information is gleaned
from appropriate analogies and that policy changes in
countries sharing common cultural traits have greater
information content than do others. Good measures of
cultural reference groups are difﬁcult to pin down, but
ideally we seek measures that tap perceived similarity
of values and shared identity across countries. Com-
mon dominant language, common colonial heritage,
andcommondominantreligioncomeclosetocapturing
thesesharedorientations.Dominantlanguagemayalso
reﬂect communication channels, and common colonial
heritage may pick up a number of structural similari-
ties that on balance may be more historical than cul-
tural. Dominant religion, on the other hand, should be
a fairly good measure of the identity and values held
by a society and a sense of cultural connectedness with
othernationswithsimilarspiritualcommitments.17 For
each language, colonial, or religious grouping we com-
pute yearly means as described above. Note that these
three variables, although quite similar, correlate only
between −0.03 and 0.43 when combined with the de-
pendent variable as described above (i.e., as Wy).
Control Variables
Economic Shocks. It is certainly likely that policy
transitionsareinﬂuencedbyconditionsthathavenoth-
ing to do with policy diffusion as we have deﬁned it.
The most likely alternative explanation is that govern-
ments,especiallythoseincloseregionalproximity,face
similareconomicconditionsand,therefore,ﬁnditinde-
pendently rational to respond in similar ways.Currency
crises, for example, may be a reason to restrict cap-
of PTA members) is not. Thus expressed, diffusion via communi-
cation among PTA members can be distinguished from the original
decision to join the PTA in the ﬁrst place.
17 On the link between cultural and, especially, religious values and
economic liberalization, see, for example, Shalev 1997.
ital outﬂows or an impetus for reform. Variation in
worldinterestratescouldcauseregionwidecapitalout-
ﬂows, capital and current account deterioration, and
exchange rate pressure (Bartolini and Drazen 1976),
with predictable pressures on policy. Similarly, robust
growth rates or an improving balance of payments
could increase policy makers’ conﬁdence in liberaliza-
tion (Goodman and Pauly 1993; but see Haggard and
Maxﬁeld 1996).
Inordertotestthesehypotheses,weenlistglobaland
country-speciﬁc economic variables with a close asso-
ciation with liberalization. We include a lagged mea-
sure of currency crises/speculative attacks collected
by David Leblang (2003) and based on Eichengreen,
Rose,andWyplosz(1995),whichmeasuresabnormally
strong market pressures for currency depreciation. We
controlforworldinterestrates(usingU.S.interestrates
as a proxy), for each country’s current account balance
as a proportion of GDP (lagged two periods to mini-
mizeproblemsofendogeneity),andforGDPpercapita
(a rough indicator of developmental level [Johnston
and Tamirisa 1998]). We control for the business cycle,
using a measure of change in GDP growth. If policy
liberalization and restriction are simply an uncoordi-
nated response to ﬁnancial or economic conditions, we
should see strong effects for this battery of variables.
To the extent that these conditions cluster in time and
space, these controls should differentiate our diffusion
mechanisms from explanations for clustering based on
commonly experienced shocks.
External Political Pressure. A second sort of exoge-
nous external shock for which we control is inspired
by traditional theories of international relations. In-
ternational politics often involve power relationships
in which decisions made by weak or vulnerable states
are the result of hegemonic pressure. One possibility
is that the United States—the avatar of economic lib-
eralism in the postwar period—has used its inﬂuence
to prevail upon countries to announce policies that
they would not have embraced otherwise. For exam-
ple, the United States has reportedly pressed Chile
and Singapore recently to liberalize further their cap-
ital accounts as a condition of free trade negotiations
(Economist 2003:15). We therefore control for the pro-
portion of each country’s trade with the United States,
as well as a partnership with the United States in a
preferential trade arrangement or bilateral investment
treaty. We even experiment with a dummy variable
identifying years in which a Republican administration
was in charge, on the theory that the United States’
inﬂuence might differ depending on the partisan ori-
entation of the president. As it is also possible that
creditorswithaninterestinliberalizationworkthrough
dominant international institutions, we control for the
useofIMFcredits,aswellasanoverallmeasureofover-
seasdevelopmentassistancepercapita(whichincludes
actual multilateral and bilateral aid disbursed). As an
alternative to the diffusion processes we have outlined
here,governmentsmightsimplyberespondingtopres-
sures by their creditors to liberalize their economies.
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This effect should be especially strong when members
need to draw upon negotiated external resources.
Domestic Political Economy. Another possibility is
that comparative political economy is sufﬁcient to ex-
plain policy transitions. Domestic preferences, capaci-
ties,andinstitutionsthemselvesmaybecorrelatedover
time or spatially, producing a pattern that resembles
policy diffusion. If the underlying political–economic
conditions common to many states in a particular re-
gion “coevolve” over time, we could mistakenly be fo-
cused on policy diffusion when we should be looking
at political, institutional, or developmental diffusion.
Economic policy liberalization may simply be the re-
sultofindependentdecisionmakinginsimilardomestic
political/institutional contexts.
We therefore control for a set of measures that cap-
tures both the nature of “demands” the polity might
make and the institutional landscape that translates
those demands into policy. The extent to which the
polity is likely to demand more open policies is ap-
proximated by the penetration of international trade,
measured here in the traditional way (imports plus ex-
ports as a proportion of GDP). Garrett, Guisinger, and
Sorens (2000) ﬁnd that democracy is associated with a
lower probability that a developing country will liber-
alize the capital account. This ﬁnding may well be due
to the difﬁculty of reconciling democratic politics with
popular demands in developing countries. We there-
foreincludeameasureofdemocracy(seeElkins2000).
La Porta et al. (1997) have argued that the nature of
the legal system has a good deal to do with the pro-
tection of property rights. Common law systems, they
claim, better protect investors and facilitate litigation-
based rather than regulatory approaches to property
rights. We hypothesize, therefore, that common law
countrieswillbemorelikelytoliberalizeandlesslikely
to restrict their ﬁnancial markets in the ways exam-
ined here. Furthermore, certain institutional magnets
for international capital might encourage the process
of liberalization. Sylvia Maxﬁeld (1997) has argued
that an independent central bank—often credited with
keeping inﬂation in check—is likely to attract exter-
nal capital. Central bank independence may therefore
underpin a government’s conﬁdence in liberalizing the
ﬂow of capital. We include data from McNamara and
Castro(augmentingearlierworkbyCukierman[1992])
that document major episodes of moves to make the
central bank more independent. And by including a
measure of the ruling party’s level of nationalism, we
considerthepossibilitythatnationalist-leaninggovern-
ments will be reluctant to initiate liberalization (see,
however, Helleiner 2002).
Geography. Geography alone may continue to exer-
cise an independent inﬂuence on economic policy dif-
fusion through mechanisms that we have not explic-
itly considered. We experiment with two geographical
variables—the logged distance between capitals and
commonborders.Ourinclusionofspatialvariablesina
fully speciﬁed model allows us to isolate the effect that
is due exclusively to changing material or reputational
payoffs and informational inﬂuences that would other-
wise be summarized in a geography term. This strategy
helps to distinguish the diffusion mechanisms we are
interested in from mere clustering.
It is important to keep in perspective just what we
are trying to accomplish by the fullest possible speci-
ﬁcation of alternative hypotheses. The challenge is to
parse out diffusion mechanisms from other plausible
explanations for policy choice. The best way to demon-
strate the likely causal impact of diffusion is to remove
alternative explanations for the mere clustering of lib-
eralization policies in time and space. If the weight
oftheevidencesuggeststhatthesecontrolsoutperform
the channels of international diffusion theorized here,
then we can be satisﬁed that traditional approaches to
the political economy of liberalization are apt.
Table 1 summarizes the mechanisms, concepts, and
measures in the model and presents their summary
statistics.
Sampling and Estimation
Our sample includes as many as 182 IMF-member
states with yearly observations from 1967 to 1996.18
We measure our dependent variables annually in bi-
nary form (see above). To model policy transitions,
we employ a semi-Markov model, which is commonly
used for estimating transitions among mutually exclu-
sivestatesofbeing.Thisapproachallowsustoconsider
transitions in both directions as well as vacillations be-
tween policies (see Allison 1984). We run two hazard
modelsforeachdependentvariable:onefortransitions
to liberal policies and one for transitions from liberal
policies.Wedonothaveespeciallystrongdistributional
assumptions except that we expect that there will be
someeffectoftimeonthehazardrate.WeuseaWeibull
survivalmodel,butaCoxproportionatehazardmodel,
on which Figures 3 and 4 are based, are substantively
identical.
Incorporating spatial variables introduces a number
of statistical complications.19 One is that spatial lags,
as weighted averages of the dependent variable in the
“neighborhood,” often capture omitted variables that
are highly correlated with membership in the group.20
Specifyingthemodelascompletelyaspossibleisimpor-
tant. We are reasonably conﬁdent that we have identi-
ﬁedsomeimportantpredictorsofliberalization,butno
model is fully speciﬁed and caution is in order before
inferring strong effects for diffusion. Multicollinearity
is another potential concern with this type of anal-
ysis. As noted above, networks of inﬂuence tend to
overlap.Forexample,countriesthataregeographically
18 Our data are both left and right censored: Roughly 100 govern-
ments are under observation since the beginning of our analysis time
(1967) and another 80 or so enter the analysis in the 1970s. Except in
the case of state dissolution, all remain at risk after 1997.
19 See Anselin 1988 for a discussion of these issues with respect to
spatial terms and Blalock 1984 or Przeworski 1974 on contextual
variables more generally.
20 For this reason, many spatial models of this kind use 2SLS or
even 3SLS estimators, an approach that comes with its own set of
complications, especially in event history models.
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clusteredarealsolikelytobeimportanttradepartners,
competitors, or cultural peers. Indeed, this is the case,
but not to an alarming degree. The correlations across
the diffusion variables range from −0.03 to 0.43.
FINDINGS
What conditions lead to policy transitions, whether
toward liberalization or toward restrictions? Table 2
reports the Weibull hazard ratios for each of the six
equations.21
Conditions That Affect Material and
Reputational Payoffs: Economic
Competition and Global Norms
Themostpronouncedeffectonpolicytransitioncomes
from economic competition, most notably competition
for global capital. Governments clearly tend to lib-
eralize when their competitors do. The inﬂuence of
policy change for countries with the same risk rat-
ings is correctly signed in all six models and is signif-
icant at least at the 90% conﬁdence level in all cases
(Table 2).22 Furthermore, when we substituted our in-
dex of comparable foreign direct investment venues
(basedoneducationoftheworkforceanddevelopment
of infrastructure), the results were correctly signed in
all six models and statistically signiﬁcant in the case
of capital control liberalization23—precisely where the
theoretical case for competition is strongest.
Trade competition, on the other hand, is a less con-
vincing causal mechanism, theoretically and empiri-
cally. Liberalization among countries that compete for
the same export markets is quite likely to be important
withrespecttoliberalizationofthecapitalaccount,but
the effects are ambiguous in the other cases. When we
substituted the measure of sectoral competition, all re-
sultswerestatisticallyinsigniﬁcant.Ifthesepoliciesare
linkedtoeconomiccompetition,itseemslikelythatthe
desire to attract capital is a far more powerful motive
than trade competition.
Whatarethesizesoftheseeffects?Thehazardratios
in Table 3 can be interpreted as the effect on the odds
oftransitionassociatedwithaone-unitmoveonthede-
pendent variable. Remember that each of the diffusion
21 Hazardratioscanberoughlyunderstoodasthechangeintheodds
of transition associated with a one-unit change in the explanatory
variable. Therefore, hazard ratios over one represent an increased
probability of transition; of zero to one, a decreased probability of
transition; and of one, zero effect. For the transitions to restrictive
states, we reverse the scoring of the diffusion variables (originally
scored as the weighted proportion of liberal policies) to be the
weightedproportionofrestrictivepolicies.Accordingly,theestimates
ofdiffusioneffectsinTable3shouldbeinthesamedirectionforboth
transitions. Not so for the control variables.
22 This ﬁnding is robust (and nearly identical) to the use of an alter-
native dataset for uniﬁcation of exchange rates based on Reinhart
and Rogoff 2002. Using those data, we estimate the hazard ratio for
the effect of other countries with a similar credit rating to be 1.756
(p < 0.05) for uniﬁcation and 1.419 (p < 0.10) for transition to a
multiple rate system.
23 The desirability of venue index returned a hazard ratio of 1.414
(p < 0.10).
variables has been rescaled to range from 0 to 10, so
thateachunitonthesevariablesrepresents10percent-
age points. Thus, if we consider the policies of capital
competitors, the model suggests that on average a shift
of10percentagepointsinthepercentageofone’scom-
petitors with a liberal policy will render a government
anywhere from 1.8 (capital account) to 2.1 (exchange
rates) times as likely to shift to a liberal policy. These
arefairlystrongeffects,asonecanillustratebyplotting
survival curves for different conditions of competition.
(In event history analysis, survival curves depict the
probability of “survival,” that is, the probability of not
havingshiftedtoanewstateorpolicy,ateachtimepoint
in the analysis.) Figure 3 plots survival curves based on
estimates of the effect of capital competition on the
probabilityofshiftingtoaliberalcapitalaccountpolicy
(thatis,theﬁrstmodelinTable3).Thecurvesrepresent
two conditions—one in which none of a governments
competitors has a liberal policy and another in which
one half of competitors have liberal policies. All other
variables in the model are held at their means. The
effects appear to be quite signiﬁcant. Almost 30% of
those with liberalized competitors would have shifted
to liberal policies by the mid 1980s, while less than 5%
of those without liberalized competitors would have
shiftedbythattime.Thiseffectappearsespeciallylarge
if we contrast it with that of a currency crisis (Figure 4).
While the effect of competition appears signiﬁcant,
global norms—operationalized as the share of coun-
tries globally assuming a particular policy stance—had
few discernible effects, and the one statistically sig-
niﬁcant result was in the unexpected direction. This
outcome suggests that it is far more likely that policy
diffusion takes place via speciﬁc conduits carved out
by economic competition, and not as a result of diffuse
signals sent by the world at large.
Diffusion Due to New Information:
Conspicuous Success, Communication
Channels, and Cultural Reference Groups
The hypothesis that success attracts adherents is well
supported by these results. Table 2 establishes a fairly
clearpattern:Governmentstendtoimplementthepoli-
cieschosenbyother“successful”countries(withtheex-
ception of capital account liberalization). In four cases,
there is evidence of a strong tendency to follow the
policies taken by the highest growth countries, mea-
suredhereasthefastest-growingdecile.24 Thisishighly
suggestive evidence that economic policy making of
themost“successful”becomesdataforupdatingpolicy
beliefs—and,ultimately,actions—ofgovernmentselse-
where. If the proportion of countries in the top decile
in growth with a liberal exchange rate policy changes
from25%to75%,theprobabilityofatransitionamong
other countries increases by 36 percentage points.
Communication networks add little to the unchan-
neled Bayesian updating model. Individual measures
of private communication via telephone generally
24 This ﬁnding applies to the highest-growth countries. When the
cutoff was made at the median, these effects were not signiﬁcant.
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TABLE 3. The Improvement in Model Fit Associated with Each Explanatory Mechanism—
Likelihood-Ratio Tests of the Joint Signiﬁcance of Blocks of Variables: Universe,
IMF Member Countries, 1966–96
Transitions to Liberal Policies Transitions to Restrictive Policies
Capital Exchange Current Capital Exchange Current
Account Rate Account Account Rate Account
Log likelihood of full model 153.988 628.616 379.005 116.229 329.877 426.308
Constrained models
Altered Payoffs
Competition = 0 26.87 (2) 25.62 (2) 64.43 (2) 1.44 (2) 33.21 (2) 6.24 (2)
p=0.00 p=0.00 p=0.00 p=0.48 p=0.00 p=0.04
New information
Learning from success=0 0.96 (1) 2.82 (1) 6.51 (1) 3.00 (1) 0.75 (1) 3.52 (1)
p=0.32 p=0.09 p=0.01 p=0.08 p=0.39 p=0.06
Ofﬁcial communication=0 12.58 (2) 3.50 (2) 6.03 (2) 0.15 (2) 0.68 (2) 1.23 (2)
p=0.01 p=0.17 p=0.49 p=0.92 p=0.71 p=0.54
Cultural similarity=0 11.44 (3) 10.16 (3) 18.07 (3) 5.22 (3) 19.08 (3) 46.8 (3)
p=0.01 p=0.01 p=0.00 p=0.15 p=0.00 p=0.00
Control mechanisms
Economic determinants=0 13.68 (3) 14.29 (3) 14.85 (3) 4.45 (3) 10.05 (3) 4.82 (3)
p=0.18 p=0.02 p=0.01 p=0.48 p=0.07 p=0.43
External political pressures=0 9.70 (2) 0.10 (2) 4.53 (2) 2.95 (2) 2.87 (2) 0.01 (2)
p=0.01 p=0.74 p=0.03 p=0.22 p=0.23 p=0.90
Political determinants=0 157.64 (4) 9.93 (4) 8.75 (4) 2.63 (4) 2.89 (4) 6.22 (4)
p=0.00 p=0.07 p=0.11 p=0.75 p=0.72 p=0.28
Geography=0 0.31 (2) 0.38 (2) 0.31 (2) 0.50 (2) 2.63 (2) 3.62 (2)
p=0.85 p=0.82 p=0.85 p=0.78 p=0.62 p=0.16
Note: H0: Measures within blocks are jointly zero. Cells are the χ2 values (degrees of freedom) and corresponding p values.
FIGURE 3. The Probability of Maintaining a Restrictive Capital Account: The Effect of Policies of
Capital Competitors
Note: Survival curve calculated from Cox proportional hazard estimates. All variables except Policies of capital competitiors held at their
means.
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FIGURE 4. The Probability of Maintaining a Restrictive Capital Account: The Effect of a Currency
Crisis in the Preceding Year
Note: Survival curve calculated from Cox proportional hazard estimates. All variables except currency crisis held at their means.
had no effects and were dropped from the models.
Private business contacts (proxied here as major im-
port and export partners) produce results that are in-
consistently signed and yield no clear insights. Ofﬁcial
contacts fared little better. Common membership in a
PTA may predict transitions to uniﬁed exchange rate
systems but otherwise have no discernible effects. The
policies of countries with which a country has signed a
bilateral investment treaty appear, if anything, to have
a negative effect on policy (statistically signiﬁcant in
thecasesofcapitalaccountliberalizationandexchange
rate uniﬁcation). We believe that this result probably
hastodowithadverseselectioneffectsforsigningaBIT
in the ﬁrst place (Elkins, Guzman, and Simmons 2003).
Overall, we ﬁnd no compelling evidence that commu-
nication ties alone affect the decision to liberalize or to
restrict external monetary and ﬁnancial policies.
Consider next the effects of cultural reference
groups. We have argued that governments may rea-
sonably search out new information from cases per-
ceived to have cultural relevance to their own situ-
ation. The most conspicuous ﬁnding here is that the
policies of countries with similar dominant religion are
remarkably inﬂuential. The effects of the other two
measures—common language and common colonial
heritage—wash out in all but a few cases (note that
policies among similar language and religious group-
ings are positively but mildly correlated at 0.29). The
effects of the policies of countries with shared religious
valuesaresigniﬁcantlypositiveforeachofthesixpolicy
transitions.25 Moreover, the size of this effect is impor-
25 This ﬁnding is robust (and nearly identical) to the use of an alter-
native dataset for uniﬁcation of exchange rates based on Reinhart
tant. In fact, a move of one standard deviation one way
or another on the mean policy of countries with sim-
ilar dominant religions is associated with a change of
roughly15pointsintheprobabilityofacountry’spolicy
transition. Cultural lenses that inﬂuence acceptance of
a particular economic policy model may provide far
more purchase on actual policy choices than the recent
political economy literature has allowed.
Control Variables
Finally, we consider the effects of the control variables.
Thehypothesisthatgovernmentsarerespondingtovar-
ious economic shocks is not especially well supported.
The directions of effects are generally as one would
expect, however. High world interest rates may tend
to decrease the probability of liberalization of the cur-
rent account. GDP growth may encourage and help
maintain current account liberalization—its only sta-
tistically signiﬁcant effect. Current account surpluses
tend to be associated with policy inertia with respect to
the uniﬁcation of the exchange rate regime (there is a
signiﬁcant reduction in the hazard rate for both liberal-
ization and restriction), whereas deﬁcits tend to stim-
ulate policy change in both directions. Currency crises
seem to be associated with liberalization in the follow-
ing period, a result that was statistically signiﬁcant for
both the capital account and exchange rate uniﬁcation.
and Rogoff 2002. Using those data, we estimate the hazard ratio for
the effect of other countries of the same dominant religion to be
1.91 (p < 0.10) for uniﬁcation and 1.184 (p < 0.05) for transition to
a multiple rate system.
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Developing countries as measured by per capita GDP
almost certainly ﬁnd it more difﬁcult to make lib-
eral transitions (statistically signiﬁcant in every case),
but the hazard ratios for implementing restrictions, al-
thoughnotstatisticallysigniﬁcant,indicatebytheircon-
sistency that developing countries may ﬁnd it harder to
implement policy transitions at all.
The results from the hegemonic variables are mixed.
In none of the models did borrowing from the IMF
increase the likelihood of a liberal policy shift. On the
other hand, as one might expect, a contract with the
IMF appears to be associated with a reluctance to re-
strict the current account. The use of IMF credits is as-
sociated with restrictions on the capital account, which
is probably indicative of capital ﬂight problems that
precipitated extramarket borrowing in the ﬁrst place.
Thereisalsosomeevidencethatoverseasdevelopment
assistanceisinsomewayrelatedtopolicyshiftsinthese
three areas. Dependence on such aid (which includes
both multilateral and bilateral sources) is associated
with liberalization of the current account and eschew-
ing of multiple exchange rate regimes, but it is also
associated with a reduction in the probability of lib-
eralizing capital markets. In order to test hegemonic
arguments further, we experimented with models that
controlled for share of exports to the United States,
shareofimportsfromtheUnitedStates,andjointmem-
bership with the United States in a preferential trade
arrangementorinabilateralinvestmenttreaty.Wealso
entered all of these variables for relations with the Eu-
ropean Union. We then controlled for the party afﬁlia-
tion of the U.S. president. None of these speciﬁcations
returned statistically signiﬁcant results, and they were
dropped from the model. Overall, it is difﬁcult to sus-
tain the argument that the waves of liberalization and
restriction in these policy areas have been systemati-
cally inﬂuenced by direct or organizationally mediated
hegemonic pressure.
The domestic political variables also behave unex-
pectedly weakly. As the political economy literature
has long held, there is evidence that people residing
in open economies demand and probably get greater
policy liberalization, at least in the case of the capital
account, and revert to restrictions with less frequency.
Nationalist governments are much less likely to liber-
alize (especially on the capital account). Democracies
tend to favor liberal transitions, although these results
are statistically signiﬁcant only for the capital account.
The effects of legal heritage—hypothesized to reﬂect
attitudes toward regulation and property rights—were
inconsistentand,withoneexceptioninthewrongdirec-
tion, insigniﬁcant. Improvements in central bank inde-
pendence were similarly not associated with particular
policy demarches.
Once we control for other factors, it appears that
geography per se is not a convincing explanation of
policy diffusion. The apparently strong geographical
effects in Figure 1 are obliterated by the functional and
culturalrelationshipsdescribedabove.Withoneminor
exception in the wrong direction, neither geographical
distance nor status as a bordering country had any in-
dependent effect on policy stance.
Another way to look at the plausibility of the diffu-
sion mechanisms we have proposed is to examine their
effects as a block. This is useful because we want to
makeclaimsaboutbroadmechanismsforwhichweem-
ploy related, but disaggregated measures. In Table 3,
we summarize the strength of these blocks by com-
paring the full model with nested models in which the
blocks of diffusion effects are constrained to zero. The
likelihood-ratio test of such comparisons indicates the
improvement in ﬁt associated with the addition of each
block of variables.26
Viewed in this way, the aggregate effects of clusters
of measures are quite robust. Economic competition
is an especially important and consistent part of the
explanationforchangeinbothdirectionsforeachofthe
three policy areas: In ﬁve of the six transition models,
theblockofmeasuresofcompetitionisalmostcertainly
signiﬁcant, with the only exception being transitions to
restrictivepoliciesinthecurrentaccount.Thevariables
that represent cultural similarity taken as a block are
consistentlyimportantinexplainingpolicychoice,with
thepossibleexceptionofcapitalaccountliberalization.
On the other hand, communication networks do not
clearly add much explanatory power to policy choice.
As we had only one indicator of learning from success,
the results in Table 3 reﬂect the ﬁndings reported in
Table 2.
The blocks of control variables are much less con-
vincingly associated with policy choice in these areas.
The economic variables jointly contribute to an im-
provement in model ﬁt in only half of the cases. The
domestic political and institutional variables do a rela-
tivelygoodjobatimprovingtheﬁtforliberaltransitions
but fail to add anything to our understanding of policy
restrictions.Hegemonicpressureseemstohelpexplain
capital and current account liberalization, but our ear-
lier models uncovered a counterintuitive direction to
these inﬂuences in the former case. Geography alone
never stands up to scrutiny.
CONCLUSIONS
There are good reasons to believe that governments
are sensitive to external signals to liberalize and to
restrict their monetary and ﬁnancial policies. Tempo-
ral and spatial clustering support the proposition that
somethingsystematicmustbedrivingstates’policiesin
this way. Indeed, this characterization is easy to accept
intuitively. Scholars and laypersons alike ﬁnd it easy to
grasp the competitive implications for Mexico of free
trade between the United States and Canada (Gruber
2000), as well as the socially emulative impulses of
developing countries (Finnemore 1996). Much is at
stake, theoretically and practically, in recognizing the
importance of policy diffusion to the current state of
globalization. The recent political economy literature
has concentrated primarily on the domestic sources of
foreign economic policy or, at most, economic policy
26 Thenullhypothesisofthesetestsisthatthejointeffectoftheblock
ofvariablesiszero.Arejection,therefore,suggeststhatthevariables
improve the ﬁt of the model.
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choiceinresponsetopricesignalsfromtheunmediated
international economy. Purely economic explanations
of policy coordination—theories of optimal currency
areas, for example—have consistently failed to cap-
ture government choices on the ground.27 Meanwhile,
international ﬁnancial markets have been extolled or
viliﬁed by heavily ideological accounts that tend to
hinder rather than assist in creative analysis. Further-
more,somescholarsandobservershaveattributedpol-
icy liberalization to exogenous pressures from the IMF
as the organizational embodiment of the “Washington
Consensus.” The analysis in this paper suggests that
these approaches do not sufﬁciently explain why gov-
ernments decide to open or restrict their economies.
Wehaveexploredtwobroadsetsofmechanismsthat
might explain patterns that appear to involve policy
diffusion among countries: altered payoffs and new in-
formation. As an example of changing payoffs, com-
petition for international capital seems to be an es-
pecially compelling explanation for the international
diffusion of liberal economic policy. Across all policy
areas, policy liberalization is highly correlated with the
orientation of other governments that compete for the
samesliceofglobalcapital.Couldthissimplybedueto
the fact that similarly rated countries are economically
similarinanumberofways,andsohaveindependently
similar incentives to open and restrict their capital and
currentaccounts?Thisispossible,thoughitisrendered
much less likely by the inclusion of a battery of eco-
nomic controls (growth, balance of payments, world
interestrates,currencycrises,developmentallevel)that
should to some extent control for this problem. We
also found that a completely different speciﬁcation of
capital competitors, aimed more directly at competi-
tion for foreign direct investment and based on similar
levelsofeducationandinfrastructure,yieldedresultsin
the correct direction, which were highly signiﬁcant for
liberalization of the capital account. The relationship
between competition for capital and policy diffusion
is so empirically strong and theoretically plausible in
these tests that it should be a high priority for future
research.
Next we tested arguments that new information
and learning contribute to economic policy diffusion.
Empirical work on learning must be grounded in plau-
sible, observable proxies for this essentially psycholog-
ical process. Our strategy has been to look for the ob-
servable implications of learning, which we believe in
theﬁrstinstanceareinﬂuencedbyexamplesofconspic-
uous economic success. Indeed, policies of the highest
growth countries did have a signiﬁcant impact on four
of the policy choices examined here. Interestingly, this
ﬁnding did not hold for capital account liberalization.
Given the recent acknowledgment of such proliber-
alization institutions as the IMF and the Economist
newspaper that capital account liberalization makes
27 Of the many studies that fail to explain extant currency patterns
based on OCA theory, see Ghosh and Wolf (1994), who ﬁnd that
neither Europe nor the United States forms an optimum currency
area; for both regions the costs of adopting a single currency exceeds
estimates of the transaction cost savings.
sense only in speciﬁc macroeconomic and regulatory
contexts, this ﬁnding is actually quite encouraging.
Few political economists, (though of course many
more sociologists) would have nominated broad cul-
tural orientation as a central explanation for policy dif-
fusion.Theresultshere,however,aredifﬁculttoignore.
Our results show that governments tend to liberalize
andtorestrictthecapitalaccount,currentaccount,and
exchange rate regime along the lines of countries with
which they share a religious identity, when we control
for a wide range of other factors. A striking ﬁnding is
thatthisrelationshipholdsinallthreepolicyareas,and
symmetrically for both liberalization and restriction.
The evidence supports neither the “world culture” so-
ciologists,whoemphasizetheirrationalityofabsorbing
global culture willy-nilly, nor the political economists,
who remove culture from the calculus of policy choice
altogether.Wesuggestthatgovernmentssystematically
consider the lessons their cultural peers have to offer
whenfashioningtheirowneconomicpolicychoices.Of
course, religion should be thought of as just one indi-
cator that taps the broader value orientation or cul-
tural identity of a society. Note also that we are not
arguing that religion speaks directly to the question of
capital controls or exchange rate arrangements. These
resultsdosuggest,though,thatvaluescommontoapar-
ticular religious tradition may shape attitudes toward
risk,individualism,equality,andmaterialismgenerally.
Governments tend to take these shared attitudes into
account when searching for appropriate models in the
absence of perfect (or perfectly understood) informa-
tion. Cultural values may be a fundamental source of
identity for governments as much as for individuals,
with consequences for highly material arenas of policy
choice.
One thing is clear: Economics and comparative po-
liticaleconomycantakeusonlysofarinunderstanding
the ebb and ﬂow of foreign economic policy liberaliza-
tionoverthepastthreedecades.Theapparentdiffusion
ofpolicychoiceoverthistimedemandsexplicitlyinter-
national or indeed transnational theory and testing. As
we think in these directions, we may uncover under-
emphasized sources of authority that structure compe-
titionandchannelthesearchforappropriatemodelsof
foreigneconomicpolicy.Researchintothedynamicsof
globalization and its underlying governance structures
should push us to understand how and why this takes
place.
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